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Aggregate Private R&D Investments in Agriculture: The
Role of Incentives, Public Policies, and Institutions*
Oscar Alfranca
University Politecnica de Catalunya, Barcelona
Wallace E. Huffman
Iowa State University
Most observers have come to agree that Research and Development (R&D)
is fundamental to the innovations that take place in advanced countries and
that drive growth and development around the world. This is equally true for
agricultural R&D, which has substantially increased the supply of food and
fiber over time. Given the evident importance of agricultural R&D, we look
at the forces that determine the amount of privately funded research in this
vital sector using a sample of European countries. We construct indicators of
private incentives, property rights, and publicly funded research in the various
countries. Private research has grown with unusual speed in recent years and
offers the prospect of advances in the quality of agricultural goods as well
as reductions in their costs. Furthermore, considerable interest exists in know-
ing how changes in private and public research expenditures are related em-
pirically; for example, are they complements or substitutes?1 If they are sub-
stitutes, then additional private agricultural R&D expenditures may not result
in larger total agricultural research expenditures.
The objective of this article is to present econometric evidence quanti-
fying the effects of economic incentives, public policies, and institutions on
national aggregate private agricultural R&D investments or expenditures. Pre-
vious studies have generally emphasized only one or at most two of these
issues, but the primary hypothesis of this article is that all three are important
and that interactions exist among them. Although the European Union (EU)
is undergoing major economic integration, member countries continue to ex-
hibit substantial differences in institutions, public policies, size, and relative
importance of agriculture. Hence, these countries provide a good set of ob-
servations for testing our main hypothesis.2 A model is formulated and fitted
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to annual data for nine EU countries, for the period 1984–95; we find strong
impacts of incentives, public policies, and institutions on private aggregate
agricultural R&D investment; we find interactions between public policies
and institutions. Furthermore, for the EU countries in this study, the evidence
is that public agricultural R&D crowds-out private agricultural R&D invest-
ments at low levels of private R&D, but at high levels of private R&D, they
are complementary.
Private Agricultural R&D
First, we review the economics of private R&D investment decisions and
selective empirical results, and second, we summarize the nature of private
agricultural R&D investments in Western Europe.
General Issues
Private firms and individuals conduct research because they expect pecuniary
rewards or payoffs. A number of conditions affect these decisions, and at the
industry level, R&D expenditures are the results of aggregation over individual
firm decisions. A useful discovery or innovation may enable reductions in
the cost of producing an existing good, improve the quality of an existing
good, or enable the development of a new good. The cost of discoveries is
affected by the price of research inputs, the efficiency of the organization of
research, the technological opportunities, the stock of available knowledge
that can be drawn on, and the tax treatment of R&D expenditures.3
The returns to private R&D are determined by the potential size of the
market for the discovery or aggregate demand, the ability of the discoverer
to appropriate benefits, and the expected length of the useful economic life
of a discovery. The size of the market for the discovery is affected by the
market structure for existing products. For example, monopoly in the original
product market reduces the demand for a discovery over competition in that
market.4 Each national market for goods and services is affected by regulatory
policies and the existence of close substitutes. The openness of a country to
trade is a major factor affecting the total size of the market for a discovery.
The ability of a discoverer to appropriate benefits from a discovery de-
pends critically on the nature of the discovery, institutional mechanisms that
exist for protecting intellectual property, and the general efficiency of public
institutions. Once made, a discovery is either a pure public good or an impure
public good. It is a pure public good when benefits are nonrival, that is, one
user of the discovery does not affect the quantity or quality of knowledge
available to other potential users, and nonexcludable, that is, the benefits from
using the discovery cannot feasibly be excluded from those who want to use
it, even though they pay nothing to the discoverer.5 Furthermore, the use-
value of the discovery is private information to the user, and he or she has
no incentive to accurately reveal it. With these conditions, a discoverer cannot
expect to appropriate (significant) benefits from other private users by charging
fees for use.
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A private discoverer, however, can use a pure public good discovery to
produce and sell a product or to support an ongoing business, for example,
to manufacture and market a durable good or to produce and market hybrid
seeds. By attempting to keep the discovery secret and having a head start
moving down the learning curve, a firm may be able to obtain some benefits
from pure public good discoveries.6 However, if the discovery is ever revealed
publicly or can be reverse engineered, the pure public-good attributes of the
discovery will come to play, and the discoverer will share benefits of the
discovery with all other users.7 These are reasons why private firms find
research programs focused on discoveries that are of a pure public-good nature
to be generally poor private investments, why large firms tend to view this
research more favorably than small ones, and why private provision of these
discoveries, although positive, is much less than the social optimum.
Economies of size enable large firms to respond to the high-income
consumer by providing a stream of new products through the use of both
science and communication.8 R. W. Ward, who emphasizes the joint impor-
tance of “new products” and “images,” contends that attracting the most
technically and possibly the most artistically competent employees is relevant
in very large food firms.9 J. C. M. Van Trijp and J. E. B. M. Steenkamp
observe that the R&D and marketing functions are linked in consumer-oriented
new product design.10 Moreover, the production of commercially successful
items seems to require a broad multidimensional innovation approach. So,
global size relates primarily to firm incentives.
When discoveries are impure public goods in the sense that they are
excludable, the potential for discoverers to capture benefits from their dis-
coveries increases. The legal institution of intellectual property rights (IPRs)—
for example, patents, breeders’ rights, copyrights, trade secrets, trademarks—
is the main mechanism for accomplishing this. These property rights are
created by nation-states and enforced by nation-states and international con-
ventions or treaties. With patents, breeders’ rights, and copyrights, the dis-
coverer is given an exclusive right to control the use, including charging a
fee for use, for a finite time period. This institution provides an added method
by which discoverers can expect to obtain remuneration from others for the
use of their discoveries.11
Western European countries harmonized their patent laws in 1977 and
adopted a “first-to-file-for-a-patent” rule in deciding priority claims to pat-
entable inventions. With this rule, patents are issued to the first person to file
an application that can validly claim to have made an invention, and the
patents last for 20 years from the date of application.12 The first-to-file rule
seems to provide less protection to discoverers than the first-to-invent rule
applied by the U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office. Given a fixed length of
term for a patent, the first-to-invent rule provides an incentive for firms who
use discoveries to support a competitive edge in a product market to delay patent
application until another firm has applied for a patent because the inventor can
later prove that he or she was the first to discover. The first-to-file rule seems
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likely to lower transaction costs associated with litigation over who is the “first”
relative to a first-to-invent rule.13 Until the 1980s, intellectual property pro-
tection of biological materials had been limited primarily to secrecy. This
changed first with the introduction of breeder rights, for example, plant variety
protection certificates, in the 1970s, and then the extension of patents to
biological materials (living organisms, plants, and nonhuman mammals) in
the 1980s. The applications of recombinant DNA techniques have resulted in
transgenic plants and animals being created, and the courts have ruled that
these innovations have been large enough that they are not the products of
nature and hence can be patented. The expected returns to private biotech
research have been clouded, however, by environmental and health issues
raised by antibiotech interest groups.14
If no institutional structure exists to easily enforce them, the granting of
intellectual property rights to discoveries is of little value. For example, if the
court system is very slow, legal fees are high, and court decisions are fre-
quently reversed, an insecure institutional structure will reduce the expected
private benefits of discovery relative to their full potential value. Failure to
compensate for positive spillovers might be a negative incentive for private
R&D investments. Hence, an effective legal system reduces uncompensated
spillovers, which must occur for private incentives to direct efforts to private
R&D.
Generally, insecure contractual and property rights discourage private
investments by reducing the expected return and increasing the riskiness of
investment.15 Insecure private property rights frequently arise from weak and
inefficient institutions, as reflected in bureaucratic delays in the provision of
civil services, weak contract enforcement, and public takings of private prop-
erty without fair compensation.16
In the United States, R. Levin et al. surveyed firms operating in 130
narrowly defined lines of business and found that patents were regarded as a
highly effective means of appropriating returns primarily in drugs, organic
chemicals, and pesticides.17 Outside the pharmaceutical and chemical indus-
tries, firms reported that the advantages of having a head start and the “ability
to move quickly down the learning curve” were more effective means of
appropriating than patents. Biotechnology, however, was not covered in that
survey. For process innovations, firms in most industries viewed secrecy as
more effective than patents.18
Thus, aggregate expenditures for an industry are determined by complex
interactions among participants.19 The transfer (degree of publicness), the
appropriability (IPRs and spillovers), and cooperation among affected firms
(or noncooperative) affect aggregate investment.20 Although highly structured
theoretical models provide clear predictions, the empirical evidence has been
quite mixed, and some of it is quite weak. For example, W. Cohen and R.
Levin concluded that too much emphasis has been placed on the effects of
industrial structure on private R&D investments and not enough on other
issues.21
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Spillover or borrowing effects reflect some of the new R&D research at
the industry level. In relatively early work, J. Bernstein and M. I. Nadiri found
significant production-cost-reducing and factor-intensity effects of a com-
pany’s own R&D and interindustry R&D spill-ins.22 J. D. Adams found that
within- and between-industry R&D spill-ins operated with a long lag but were
a significant factor in explaining industrial productivity.23 R. E. Evenson and
Y. Kislev, and also Evenson and D. Gollin, have shown transnational transfers
of plant genetic material and crop varieties to be important to general varietal
improvement, but borrowing is costly—knowledge does not spill-in costlessly.24
Agriculture in Europe
In the EU and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries, a large share of private agricultural R&D is invested in
agricultural inputs—agricultural chemicals, plant breeding, farm machinery,
and animal health—and food and kindred products but relatively little (less
than 10%) in farm-level technologies.25 In the EU, private agricultural R&D
has been focused on agro-chemistry (folliculars, fertilizers, micronutrients,
fungicides, insecticides, and soil disinfectants), plant breeding and varietal
development, plant nutrition, plant growth regulators, plant parasitology, ma-
rine aquaculture, raw material production from cultured media (e.g., corn
syrups, sugars), enzymatic conversion of starch to sugars, biotechnology in
plants, combine and harvesting machine development, safety and ergonomics
in farm machinery, and veterinary pharmaceuticals.
The focus of private agricultural R&D differs across Western European
countries. In the United Kingdom, agricultural chemicals, machinery, and
feeding stuffs have been important.26 The Cambridge Plant Breeding Institute
was transferred from the public sector to the private sector (Unilever) in 1987.
Unilever then sold it to Monsanto in 1998. In the Netherlands, private research
on horticultural crops is large. In France, private R&D—for example, in
Vilmoria, the Cooperative Society for Research and Experimentation of the
Eastern Pyrenees, the Technical Institute of the Sugar Beet Industry and the
co-op Limagrain—is primarily focused on plant breeding, pesticides, and fer-
tilizers. In Germany, private R&D is focused on pesticides and fertilizers, for
example, companies like BASF, BAYER, , and Hoechst; agricul-Kali Salz
tural machinery, for example, Deutz and Mercedes; and animal feed and
pharmaceuticals. In Sweden and Denmark, private research is on fertilizers,
forestry, and communication systems.
Patent laws for the EU countries have been strengthened over the past
4 decades and are in general much stronger than in developing countries, but
somewhat less than in the United States.27 Among EU countries, Finland,
Portugal, and Ireland have had relatively weak patent rights over the period
1960–90, and Sweden, Germany, and Denmark have significantly strengthened
their patent rights over time (see table 1).
Cross-country comparisons of private and public agricultural R&D ex-
penditures are made difficult by the fact that each country has its own definition
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TABLE 1
National Indexes of Patent Rights, Western Europe: 1960–90
Country/Region 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Western Europe:
Austria 3.38 3.38 3.48 3.48 3.81 3.81 4.24
Belgium 3.05 3.38 3.38 3.38 3.38 4.05 3.90
Denmark 2.33 2.66 2.80 2.80 3.62 3.76 3.90
Finland 1.99 1.99 2.14 2.14 2.95 2.95 2.95
France 2.76 3.10 3.24 3.24 3.90 3.90 3.90
Germany 2.33 2.66 3.09 3.09 3.86 3.71 3.71
Greece 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.32
Ireland 2.23 2.56 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99
Italy 2.99 3.32 3.32 3.46 3.71 4.05 4.05
Netherlands 2.95 3.29 3.61 3.47 4.24 4.24 4.24
Norway 2.66 2.66 2.80 2.80 3.29 3.29 3.29
Portugal 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98
Spain 2.95 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.62
Sweden 2.33 2.66 2.80 2.80 3.47 3.47 3.90
Switzerland 2.38 2.71 3.14 3.14 3.80 3.80 3.80
United Kingdom 2.70 3.04 3.04 3.04 3.57 3.57 3.57
Subgroup mean 2.60 2.82 2.97 2.97 3.39 3.46 3.52
United States 3.86 3.86 3.86 3.86 4.19 4.52 4.52
Mean: 111 countries 2.13 2.22 2.27 2.28 2.40 2.44 2.46
Source.—Adapted from J. C. Ginarte and W. G. Park, “Determinants of Patent Rights: A
Cross-National Study,” Research Policy 26 (1997): 283–301.
of what is included in private and public research, and the restructuring of
public agricultural research in some of these countries over the past 2 decades
has changed what is now included in public and private research.28 For ex-
ample, in the United Kingdom, some public agricultural research institutions
have been sold to the private sector,29 and in the Netherlands, research insti-
tutions of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management, and Fisheries
have been turned into a quasi-public institution (DLO). German data have
special problems because of the fact that two separate countries existed before
1990, and pre-1990 data cover only West Germany.
Even with these deficiencies, it is useful to present some comparisons
across EU countries. Table 2 presents information showing large differences
in the share of private agricultural research expenditures in total public and
private agricultural research expenditures of 14 EU countries for 1985, 1990,
and 1995. The United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Sweden stand out for their
large private sector shares, and Germany, Ireland, and Spain have unusually
small shares. Furthermore, these data do not suggest a strong increase in the
private R&D share over 1985–95. However, it is safe to conclude that private
agricultural R&D has more of an input focus than public agricultural R&D.
The Econometric Model, Data, and Results
An econometric model of national aggregate annual private R&D investment
is specified and fitted to panel data for nine EU countries (Austria, France,
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TABLE 2
Private Agricultural R&D Expenditures as a Share of Total Public and
Private Agricultural R&D Expenditures, EU-13, Selected Years (%)
Country 1985 1990 1995
Austria 41.2 34.9 36.9
Denmark 44.6 31.2 27.7
Finland 41.3 29.2 36.2
France 25.0 19.1 26.0
Germany 13.8 11.7 9.3
Greece 29.2 22.1 15.0
Ireland 16.6 25.6 12.8
Italy 23.9 24.4 25.9
Netherlands 59.6 59.2 47.9
Norway 34.2 46.6 38.4
Portugal 14.5 36.7 21.3
Spain 11.4 10.3 9.0
Sweden 47.1 42.2 43.2
United Kingdom 65.0 62.3 61.5
Sources.—OECD, Statistical Compendium, Agricultural Statistics, Agriculture, Hunting
and Forestry (Paris: OECD, 2001), Statistical Compendium, Industry, Science and Tech-
nology: Basic Science and Technology (Paris: OECD, 2001), and (for GDP implicit price
level) Statistical Compendium, National Accounts (Paris: OECD, 2001); Colin Thirtle, “Ag-
ricultural Research, Development and Extension Expenditures in the UK, 1947–1993,”
EPARD Discussion Paper no. 14 (University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Department of Ag-
ricultural Economics, 1989); and C. Thirtle, P. Palladino, and J. Piesse, “On the Organization
of Agricultural Research in the United Kingdom, 1945–1994: A Quantitative Description
and Appraisal of Recent Reforms,” Research Policy 26 (1997): 557–76, for the United
Kingdom.
Note.—EU p European Union.
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom)
over 1986–95. These countries account for a very large share of agricultural
product in the EU: about 85.6%. Unavailability of private R&D expenditure
time series data has been the main restriction to including more countries in
the data set. Although the countries included in the panel collect and report
R&D in line with the Frascati Manual, some specifications differ from the
OECD standard. If definitions for the data are not identical, this makes mean-
ingful comparisons more difficult, and it can be a source of measurement
errors. Problems are most likely to arise with the definitions of the science
and technology indicators and with methodological changes during the sample
period (see appendix).
The Econometric Model
Definitions of variables as well as sample mean values, minimum and max-
imum values, and the standard deviations are presented in table 3.30 Figure 1
displays the pattern of growth of (real) private agricultural R&D investments
in each of the nine sample countries over 1984–95. These investments com-
prise the dependent variable to be explained by our econometric model.
The econometric model of aggregate gross real private R&D investment
8TABLE 3
Definitions and Summary Statistics
Symbol Definitions of Variables Mean Maximum Minimum SD
PrivateR&DInvt Aggregate private investment in agricultural R&D: na-
tional annual aggregate private expenditures or gross
investment on agricultural R&D* divided by the GDP
implicit price level.† 3.59 5.09 1.96 .94
InterestRatet Real interest rate (%): the short-term interest rate on na-
tional government bonds (International Monetary Fund,
Treasury-bill rate) less the annual rate of inflation on
gross domestic product.† 5.17 17.36 4.99 3.10
PrivateR&DCapt1 Aggregate private agricultural R&D capital: the 1-year
lagged value of the real national stock of private agri-
cultural R&D.* Nominal R&D expenditures are de-
flated by the GDP implicit price level,† GDP then the
stock is derived using the perpetual inventory method
assuming a 12% depreciation rate. 5.34 6.98 3.21 .93
PrivR&DSpillint2 Index of the transnational private R&D spill-in potential:
the commodity weighted stock of public agricultural
R&D in other sample countries lagged 2 years. 7.57 8.20 6.27 .55
PublicR&DCapt1 Aggregate public (Ministry of Agriculture and University)
agricultural R&D capital lagged 1 year: nominal na-
tional public agricultural R&D expenditures* deflated
by the GDP implicit price level,† then the stock is de-
rived using the perpetual inventory method assuming a
12% depreciation rate. 6.63 8.58 4.41 1.01
AgOutputt1 Aggregate agricultural production lagged 1 year: the total
value of final agricultural production‡ divided by the
GDP implicit price level.† 8.80 10.00 .64 .64
9CropSharet1 Crop share (%), lagged 1 year: value of crop production
as a share of total value of final agricultural
production.‡ 44.39 41.14 28.88 10.71
PatentRightst An index obtained by summing 0 to 1 scores for each of
five categories of patent law: extent of coverage, mem-
bership in international patent agreements, provision
for loss of protection, enforcement mechanism, and du-
ration of protection.§ Overall the index takes values
0–5 with large values indicating stronger patent rights. 3.59 4.24 1.98 .65
EfficientBureaucracyt Measures the speed and efficiency of the civil service,
scored 0–4 with higher scores for greater efficiency.k 2.33 2.40 1.50 .35
ContractEnforcementt Contract enforcement: measures the relative degree to
which contractual agreements are honored and compli-
cations are presented by language and mentality differ-
ence, scored 0–4 with higher scores for greater
enforcement.k 2.87 3.20 1.80 .57
Opennesst Economic openness: measures the extent of preferential
treatment of nationals over foreigners in legal matters
(and risk of expropriation for no compensation), scored
0–4 with higher scores indicating relatively more fa-
vorable treatment or less risk to foreign interests.k 2.76 3.4 2.00 .39
D(l) Country dummy variable taking a 1 if observation is
country , France, Germany, Italy, Nether-l (lp Austria
lands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, or United Kingdom)
and 0 otherwise.
* OECD, Statistical Compendium, Industry, Science and Technology: Basic Science and Technology (Paris: OECD, 2001).
† OECD, Statistical Compendium, National Accounts, GDP implicit price level (Paris: OECD, 2001).
‡ OECD, Statistical Compendium: Agricultural Statistics; Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry (Paris: OECD, 2001).
§ See J. C. Ginarte and W. G. Park, “Determinants of Patent Rights: A Cross-National Study,” Research Policy 26 (1997): 283–301.
k S. Knack and P. Keefer, “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures,” Economics and Politics 7
(1995): 207–27.
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Fig. 1.—Private R&D investment in agriculture (in logs)
or expenditure is one that incorporates variables representing the effect of
incentives, public policies, institutions, and a time trend. The incentives relate
primarily to the size and composition of agricultural output. Each country has
a set of institutions represented by country-specific indicators of patent rights,
efficient bureaucracy, civil contract enforcement, and economic openness,
which are hypothesized to affect the rate of private investment. Public policies
such as public agricultural research investment decisions are expected to affect
private R&D investment decisions. Transnational R&D capital is also expected
to affect domestic private R&D investments.
The exact econometric specification of the private aggregate agricultural
R&D investment equation is
ln (PrivateR&DInv )plt
9
D(l) b InterestRate  b ln (PrivateR&DCap ) 2 lt 3 lt1
lp1
 b ln (PrivR&DSpillin ) b ln (PublicR&DCap )4 lt2 5 lt1
 b ln (AgOutput ) b CropShare  b trend6 lt1 7 lt1 8
 b PatentRights  b EfficientBureaucracy (1)9 lt 10 lt
 b ContractEfficiency  b Openness11 lt 12 lt
 b (ln PrivateR&DCap )# (ln PublicR&DCap )13 lt1 lt1
 b (ContractEnforcement )# (EfficientBureaucracy ) m ,14 lt lt lt
2 2 2Em p 0, Em p j , Em m p j , ∇l, q, t,lt lt l lt qt lq
where is a random disturbance term representing the effects of omittedmlt
variables that are peculiar to both a country (l) and time period (t). It has a
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zero mean and constant variance over time for any given country, but it differs
across countries, and the disturbances are assumed to be contemporaneous
correlated across countries. We assume that any unmeasured time-invariant
country effects are uncorrelated with the time-varying regressors.31 Homo-
geneity of degree zero is imposed on the R&D investment equation by de-
flating all nominal flow magnitudes by the GDP price deflator index.32
We now present and discuss hypotheses. We expect a higher private real
interest rate or the opportunity cost of private investment funds to reduce the
net present value of private R&D investments, other things equal, and to
reduce the demand for private R&D investment, that is, . Private R&Db ! 02
capital represents a stock of past discoveries that may be useful in future
discoveries because they provide key building blocks to future discoveries,
but the exhaustion of the innovative potential might be occurring faster than
it is being restored, that is, “using up” some of the innovative potential.33
Hence, the expected sign of is a priori uncertain. Private and public R&Db3
capital seem likely to interact in affecting private agricultural R&D investment
decisions, and they might be complements or substitutes:
 ln (PrivateR&DInv )lt
p b  b ln (PublicR&DCap ). (2)3 13 lt1
 ln (PrivateR&DCap )lt1
If private research and public research capital are complements, then willb13
be positive, and if they are substitutes or if “crowding-out” of private by
public investment occurs, then will be negative. Thus, the expected netb13
effect of the private R&D stock on current private R&D investment is a priori
uncertain.
Private agricultural R&D investments in one country may affect invest-
ment decisions in other countries through transnational R&D transfers. These
transfers are really of two types: (i) the size of the pool of generally accessible
knowledge that is available from the outside for use by a particular country’s
scientists and (ii) the size of the borrowable stock of R&D from the outside,
that is, knowledge relevant to the country’s agriculture, or where the “technical
distance is short.”34 For private R&D, transnational privately funded R&D is
“closer” to the private R&D of a country than public R&D and should be a
substitute. Second, transfers proxy the product market rivalry between firms
in different countries.35
Evenson, and also D. K. N. Johnson and Evenson, present evidence of
spill-ins for patented innovations across selected European countries.36 These
transfers are expected to be larger and more direct when the R&D is undertaken
by large multinational companies, but even for R&D undertaken by domestic
companies, some transnational externalities may occur. If transfer discoveries
can be used directly, we expect , or that transnational private R&Db ! 04
capital crowds-out private R&D investment. Alternatively, if domestic re-
search must be undertaken to adapt new spill-in technology to local conditions,
for example, costly borrowing, then we expect .b 1 04
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In our model, we adopt a 2-year lag for the international transmission
of agricultural knowledge. The main reason is the likely slower transmission
of information and technology when it must cross national boundaries, for
example, because of different languages, cultures, and so on. In our model,
the regional stock of knowledge from borrowing is obtained by weighing
R&D expenditures with the share of a country’s output from wheat and milk
production, which is a proxy for similarity of agricultural product mix.37 The
regional borrowable knowledge stock is formed by the general stock of bor-
rowable knowledge less a country’s own contribution.38
The marginal effect of public R&D capital on private agricultural R&D
investment is:
 ln (PrivateR&DInv )lt
p b  b ln (PrivateR&DCap ). (3)5 13 lt1
 ln (PublicR&DCap )lt1
If public R&D is generally crowding-out private R&D, then the sign for
equation (3) will be negative. We expect the main effect of public R&D capital
in agriculture to be a substitute for private R&D, but if the interaction term
with private R&D capital is positive, that is, , then at some level ofb 1 013
private R&D capital, public R&D capital complements private R&D invest-
ment. A country having done more private R&D in the past then allows it to
make better use of the public R&D capital.
The potential size of the national market for private agricultural inno-
vations is proxied by the volume of agricultural production (AgOutput) and
the crop share of final agricultural production (CropShare), both lagged 1 year.
We expect the payoff to private agricultural R&D to be positively related to
the size of local agriculture, or , to be positive. Livestock-related sectorsb6
such as milk, swine, beef, and poultry are important to EU agriculture, as
they account for 45% of agricultural output. The livestock sector, which has
been highly protected from external competition, has been the focus of new
technology development, for example, automation, artificial insemination, and
new feeding systems for the local environment. Crop production has been
heavily focused on supporting the livestock industry and on wine production.
Hence, the expected sign of is negative.b7
Next, consider the effects of variables representing the effects of insti-
tutions. Stronger patent rights are expected to increase private R&D invest-
ments because private firms can expect to obtain a larger share of the social
benefits from innovations resulting from their research and development, that
is, , but with a patent life of 20 years, we do not expect to precludeb 1 09
future related inventions that must build on past inventions. The speed and
efficiency of civil services is expected to facilitate domestic private R&D
investment. If obtaining needed permits and licenses involves slow and cum-
bersome processes, this will weight heavily against domestic private R&D
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investment decisions. Furthermore, if efficient bureaucratic and contract en-
forcement are complementary, we expect to be positive:b14
 ln (PrivateR&DInv )lt
p b  b ContractEnforcement (4)10 14 lt
(EfficientBureaucracy )lt
and
 ln (PrivateR&DInv )lt
p b  b EfficientBureaucracy . (5)11 14 lt
(ContractEfficiency )lt
Although the EU is a developed region, the extent of development and property
rights differs. If the innovations needed by farmers must be highly tailored
to local geoclimatic conditions, then strong rights for local compared with
foreign firms would be important to private R&D investments, that is, this
could lead to local protectionism and being negative.b12
The country dummy variables in equation (1) are country-specific[D(l)]
intercept terms or fixed effects, which accommodate cross-country differences
in definitions of private R&D and differential R&D spill-in effects from EU
countries not included in our sample. They also represent time-invariant but
unspecified country-specific other factors, for example, agro-climatic condi-
tions, major soil types, and proximity to other specific countries. We assume
a constant relationship among the set of variables in our model and also that
problems sometimes ascribable to random deviation of the characteristics of
countries from their mean values are not important.39 Besides, the econometric
model is to be fitted to data over a relatively short time period, and random-
effect estimates tend to be quite imprecise under these conditions.40
The Results
Equation (1) for each of the nine countries is stacked as a seemingly unrelated
regression model, with coefficients on identical regressors being constrained
to be the same across countries, except for the intercept, and fitted by the
Zellner seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation method with cross-
country heteroscedasticity.41 Thus, there are 90 observations obtained by pool-
ing the 10 observations per country over the nine EU countries. The estimated
coefficients of the aggregate private agricultural R&D investment equation
and associated t-ratios are presented in table 4.42
Overall, the fitted model performs well. All coefficients are different
from zero at the 5% significance level, and the hypothesis that the R&D
investment equation has no explanatory power (i.e., all coefficients except for
country fixed effects are zero) is rejected at the 1% significance level. Re-
gression equation (1), table 4, has a large (0.97), indicating that a very2R
large share—over 97%—of the variation of the log private agricultural R&D
investments about its mean is explained by the regressors in the model.
Turning to particular effects, a higher real interest rate decreases private
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TABLE 4
Seemingly Unrelated Estimates of Investment Equation for National Aggregate
Private Agricultural R&D: Nine EU Countries, 1984–95
Regressors*
Regression
Equation (1) Equation (2)
Coefficient t Value Coefficient t Value
Interest Ratet .017 14.21 .025 14.97
ln (PrivateR&DCap )t1 .456 6.26 .977 12.50
ln (PrivR&DSpillin )t2 .063 2.05 .139 5.95
ln (PublicR&DCap )t1 .597 6.59 .384 6.04
ln (AgOutput )t1 1.204 8.55 .658 9.55
CropSharet1 .019 9.75 .0004 .80
PatentRightst .472 2.47
EfficientBureaucracyt 2.592 7.69
ContractEnforcementt .954 3.40
Opennesst .553 12.90
Trend .072 10.90 .059 13.77
ln(PrivateR&DCapt1)
# ln(PublicR&DCapt1 ) .080 8.76 .016 1.49
ContractEnforcementt
# EfficientBureaucracy t .959 7.84
D(Austria) 5.049 4.02 4.019 5.87
D(France) 5.850 4.09 4.550 5.63
D(Germany) 6.911 5.29 4.683 5.90
D(Italy) 5.757 4.11 4.874 5.94
D(Netherlands) 6.162 4.49 4.549 5.94
D(Portugal) 6.629 7.19 1.350 3.57
D(Spain) 5.562 4.24 4.969 6.57
D(Sweden) 4.520 3.94 3.537 5.25
D(United Kingdom) 6.739 4.96 4.898 6.29
(adjusted)2R .974 .969
Durbin Watson 1.877 1.64
Note.—EU p European Union.
* Each country has its own separate intercept, which is the coefficient of the country-
specific dummy variable, i.e., there is no common intercept term.
R&D investment. The real opportunity cost of capital matters for private
agricultural R&D investment. Public and private R&D capital are comple-
mentary in affecting private R&D investment, that is, the estimated value of
is positive, and the main effect of private R&D capital is also positive,b13
so that the effect of private R&D capital on private R&D investment is strictly
positive. The impact elasticity, evaluated at the sample mean of public ag-
ricultural research capital, is 0.985. Thus, having done more private R&D in
the past allows a country to make better use of the past public R&D.
Additional public R&D capital has a negative direct and positive indirect
effect on private R&D investment. At low levels of private R&D capital, for
example, at or below the sample mean, the direct effect dominates, and ad-
ditional public R&D capital substitutes for private R&D investment. Public
R&D, however, turns into a complement provided that there is enough private
R&D capital for firms to benefit, which occurs when private R&D capital is
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1.25 times its sample mean value. Hence, additional public R&D capital
sometimes decreases and at other times increases private R&D investment.43
The implication is that a reduction in public R&D capital has a positive effect
on aggregate private R&D investment, and it may be large enough to com-
pensate for the loss of public expenditures. Hence, total (public and private)
aggregated agricultural R&D investment may increase, and the private R&D
share may rise dramatically.
We have striking results that transnational private R&D transfers appear
to crowd-out privately funded R&D in the particular country that receives the
transfers. First, transnational privately funded R&D is “closer” to the private
R&D of a country than public R&D and should be a substitute. Second,
spillovers proxy for product market rivalry between firms in different coun-
tries. Hence, private R&D does not have the same transnational effects that
public R&D does.
The impact of additional agricultural output on private agricultural R&D
investment is positive, and the impact elasticity is 1.20. Larger agricultural
output leads to larger private R&D investment, but it is surprising that the
impact elasticity is larger than one. The estimated coefficient for crop share
of agricultural output is negative. Hence, output composition matters for pri-
vate R&D investment decisions, and livestock production has more favorable
effects on private R&D investments than does crop production.
Our results show that the quality of a country’s institutions is an important
factor in private agricultural R&D investment decisions. Consistent with ex-
pectations, when a country has stronger patent rights, private agricultural R&D
investment increases significantly. For efficient bureaucracy and contract en-
forcement, the estimates of and are both negative, but the coefficientb b10 11
of the interaction term is positive. When evaluated at the sample mean,(b )14
the marginal effect of efficient bureaucracy and contract enforcement on private
agricultural R&D investment is positive, 0.16 and 1.29, respectively—fewer
bureaucratic delays and better contract enforcement provide a good political-
economic climate for private agricultural R&D investment. The positive sign
for suggests that the contract enforcement and efficient bureaucracy are typesb14
of complements for affecting aggregate private R&D investment.
The effect of openness is negative. This result suggests a local political-
economic climate that is favorable to domestic firms relative to foreign firms
is most advantageous to local private agricultural R&D investment. Hence, it
is consistent with agricultural technologies needing to be adapted to local
economic conditions. Finally, the estimates of the country-specific fixed effects
differ by a large magnitude, but we place little emphasis on the size of these
parameters.
Although the empirical results for the institutional variables are quite
strong, a joint test of the null hypothesis of “no effect of institutions”—that
is, that in equation (1)—is performed. Theb p b p b p b p b p 09 10 11 12 14
sample value of the chi-squared statistic for the Wald test is 238, which is
larger than the critical value (of 11.1) with 5 degrees of freedom at the 5%
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significance level.44 Furthermore, when these restrictions are imposed on the
institutional variables (table 4, as regression eq. [2]), the size (and statistical
significance) of the estimated coefficients for some of the remaining variables
changes significantly. Hence, institutional variables do significantly affect do-
mestic private agricultural R&D investments.
Conclusions
Research and development have been shown to be major forces behind the
growth in agricultural output, especially agricultural productivity increases.
Some studies have focused on modeling and explaining the public sector’s
willingness to invest in agricultural research in an environment where R&D
produces impure public goods and positive interjurisdictional spill-ins are
regional rather than widespread.45 The current study, however, is one of the
first to examine aggregate private agricultural R&D investment using a panel
of developed countries and to identify separate effects of economic incentives,
institutions, and public policies. Furthermore, it is the first study to provide
estimates of the impacts of public agricultural research capital on domestic
private agricultural R&D investment. The impact is in fact negative at and
below the sample mean; that is, partial crowding-out occurs. Hence, if public
agricultural R&D investments decreases, private agricultural research will
increase by enough to offset the decline in public R&D investment. One
possibility is that over the time period of the study, the EU countries have
invested too heavily in applied research that is competitive with the private
sector and not enough in basic-general and pretechnology sciences. Consistent
with our findings, starting in the 1990s the national governments in some EU
countries transferred or sold part of their agricultural research units to the
private sector; for example, in both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands,
the ministries of agriculture converted their agricultural research units into
quasi-private institutions. Overall, public and private agricultural research in
these nine EU countries has been complementary, holding trend factors con-
stant. The study also finds a small negative transnational externality associated
with private agricultural R&D investment in other EU countries, suggesting
that private R&D discoveries are transmitted across country boundaries in a
way that is competitive with or crowds-out local private R&D investments.
Over time, this tendency is expected to grow as the EU becomes a single
market.
Private sector R&D investment is shown to respond positively to the size
of a country’s agriculture, and the response elasticity is larger than one. Private
agricultural R&D investments in the EU are negatively related to the relative
importance of crop output in total agricultural production, other things equal.
However, in the United States, the impression is that private R&D is more
closely tied to crop than livestock production.46
The hypothesis that institutions do not matter was rejected. Stronger
patent rights, better contract enforcement, efficient civil bureaucracy, and pro-
tectionism of local firms were shown to increase aggregate private agricultural
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R&D investment unconditionally, other things equal. Furthermore, better con-
tract enforcement and efficient civil bureaucracy appear to be complementary,
which can be a large advantage for private R&D investments in some
countries.
Over the period 1960–95, intellectual property rights in Western European
countries have been strengthened. Given our results, this seems to have been
one force for large private sector agricultural R&D investment. However, the
finding of public agricultural R&D capital partially crowding-out private ag-
ricultural R&D investment suggests that national governments in the EU may
not have adjusted fully to these changes. Restructuring public agricultural
research so that it is complementary with private agricultural R&D investment
would seem to be a good public policy for the future.
Appendix
Some particular measurement problems in the R&D data by country are outlined.
Austria. Expenditure data are based on the OECD statistical series: “Public
Finding of R&D by Socio-Economic Objective: Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries—
Version 2.” According to Phil Pardey and J. Roseboom, a complete breakdown of the
advancement of knowledge item (including university funds) would certainly result
in some increase in the agricultural research expenditure estimates.47
France. The National Centre for Scientific Research is included in the higher
education sector, whereas in other countries such as Italy, this type of organization is
classified in the government sector. Business enterprise R&D expenditure data by
industry and by source of funds are only available for intra- plus extramural expen-
diture. This is the reason why the total by source of funds by industry is higher than
the business enterprise R&D by industry.
Germany. OECD data for government R&D appropriations in Germany cover
Western Germany only until 1990 and unified Germany after 1990. Through 1985,
the technology balance of payments data for Germany cover transactions concerning
patents, licenses, trademarks, models, and designs. After 1985, these data also cover
technical services and industrial R&D. There are breaks between 1990 and 1991 as
well as between 1991 and 1992 in total and socioeconomic objectives data.
Italy. Through 1990, the data represent the sum of intramural and extramural
R&D expenditures, but after 1990, only the intramural R&D expenditure are included.
The pre-1991 data for Italy are thus only partially comparable with those of other
countries.
Netherlands. Netherlands has reorganized research in the Ministry of Agri-
culture and created a Knowledge Center associated with Wageningening Agricultural
University. This shifts some R&D expenditures from the public to the university.
Portugal. Expenditure indicators are based on a classification of scientific dis-
ciplines rather than of the socioeconomic objective. According to Pardey and Rose-
boom, consistency in institutional coverage between observations is difficult to verify,
especially for the earlier years.48
Spain. Data are underestimated between 10% and 15% per year because R&D
personnel data for higher education only include researchers but not other staff. In
October 1986, Spain joined the European patent convention. As a result, the number
of patent applications for 1986 is not comparable with later series.
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Sweden. Data for R&D performed by the government and private nonprofit
institutions are underestimated because social sciences and humanities are excluded.
The methodology for measuring government R&D appropriations has been subject to
annual changes since 1991, so that a comparison of the data from 1990 to 1994 would
appear to be of limited value only.
United Kingdom. Between 1985 and 1986 some government agencies were
reclassified to the business enterprise sector. This caused a break in series for the data
covering the performance and financing of government expenditure in R&D.
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